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Markets vs. politics : correcting erroneous beliefs differently

Publikace

Tento text není v aktuálním jazyce dostupný. Zobrazuje se verze "en".Abstrakt

In the fields of social choice, public choice and political economics, the main difference between private and political choice is whether individual preferences are aggregated to make a decision. A much less studied difference is whether beliefs are aggregated to make a decision.

In this paper, we argue that the need for aggregation creates different incentives for belief updates in private and political choice. We review contemporary theories of biased beliefs in politics: Bayesian misperceptions, behavioral anomalies, and rational irrationality.

We examine assumptions and consequences of all the approaches vis-a-vis issues of common knowledge, stability, symmetry, and multiplicity of stable states. As a route for further analysis, we construct an evolutionary model including a coordination failure.

Differences in learning dynamics make the political play of this baseline game Pareto-inferior to the private play.