Schelling and Heidegger on Dasein and Freedom : a reading of the Freedom Essay according to the lecture of 1936
Abstrakt
In this paper we present the basis of a dispositional theory of freedom in Schelling around 1809, 1810. In particular, we see its constitution as a fusion of idealist theories of freedom and the thinking of nature as life, becoming and productivity.
Although Schelling evades Spinozist determinism thanks to his dual theory of freedom, the problem of necessity reappears around 1809, 1810, when Schelling analyses in more detail the problematic relationship between human freedom and the system, as this problem unfolds in the monistic-immanent system of Spinoza, and later of Hegel. Freedom and necessity, Schelling argues, are connected as the unconscious and the conscious of man's action and character, expressed through temporal effects.
Schelling lays the foundation for this constitution of freedom "outside and beyond" all time. Continuing but modifying Kant's concept of disposition, our author points to the connection between eternal action, freedom and the unconscious in anticipation of psychoanalysis and later philosophies of the will.