Abstract
George Berkeley's doctrine of notions is often disparaged or dismissed. In a systematic interpretation and positive reconstruction of the doctrine, this monograph presents Berkeley's understanding of the inner sphere and self-awareness, and reassesses the widely held view of Berkeley as an empiricist.
Examining the development of Berkeley's philosophy from the early notebooks to the late Siris, the monograph sets out how knowledge by notion involves a radical rejection of the perceptual model of self-cognition and of the attempt to frame our knowledge of the inner by analogy with the outer. The monograph describes Berkeley's divergence from the assumption among rationalists and empiricists that we know our selves and our mental acts by idea, or by an immediate presentation before the mind.Weaving together Berkeley's conception of the intellect, conceptual thought, mathematics, ethics and theology in the light of the doctrine of notions, the monograph treats Berkeley's philosophy of mind as distinct from the empiricist tradition.