Abstract
Relying on the requirement of radicalized transcendental phenomenology, namely to think phenomenon as “nothing-but-phenomenon” the presented paper argues against three different ways of understanding intersubjectivity, providing at the same time a positive contribution to the phenomenological problem of alter ego. Firstly, it criticizes an attempt to reduce alter ego to mere Spiegelung of my own ego, pointing out that it ultimately deprives the Other of its transcendence.
Secondly, it shows, on the other hand, that ascribing to alter ego the character of “absolute transcendence” must necessairly make any intersubjective relation impossible. Thirdly, it argues against Fink’s —and also partially Scheler’s—proposal of solving the problem of intersubjectivity (which he ascribes to late Husserl) by postulating the absolute anonymous Urleben in which there is no any prior difference between ego and alter ego.
In comparison to mentioned attempts, the presented paper argues that (1) the phenomenon-as-nothing-butphenomenon implies the irreducible “original plurality”, (2) which is not yet a plurality of determined subjects (insofar as the transcendental phenomenological field remains “impersonal”. To think the essence of intersubjectivity properly, one must adhere to two conditions: preserving the transcendence of the alter ego, as well as ascribing to it a form of presence for ego without which any form of intersubjective relation would be ultimately impossible.
I argue that the “deduction” of intersubjectivity from phenomenon-as-nothing-but-phenomenon follows these requirements.