Abstract
My contribution is an investigation of Henrich's interpretation of Kant's and Fichte's theories of self-consciousness. In this investigation I proceed in two steps.
Firstly, I attempt to show that there is textual evidence in Fichte's "Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre" for claiming that the formula "the I posits itself as positing itself" can be seen as something which defines Fichte's theory of the I not only in the "Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo" but also in the "Grundlage". As part of this first step, there is an attempt to show that the Eye-Metaphor, employed by Fichte when defining his late theory of absolute knowledge, has the same conceptual meaning and structure as the expression "for itself" which had been used as part of the definition of the I in the "Grundlage".
The conceptual interpretation of the Eye-Metaphor then allows, in the second step, to provide an interpretation of the part played by A 108 in the first version of the transcendental deduction of the categories.