The aim of the paper is to shed light on Schmitt's understanding of the state of exception. There is a widespread reading in academic literature that Schmitt was the spiritual father of the so-called "exceptionalism".
According to its moderate version, Schmitt held the view that the Rechtsstaat is unable to resolve crises based on its legal order and that they can be overcome only by means of unrestrained action of the sovereign. In a radical version of this interpretation, it is straightforwardly Schmitt's program that the normless and exceptionless exception ought to replace the Rechtsstaat. In this paper, it is my goal to demonstrate that both versions of the exceptionalist reading represent a misinterpretation that cannot be defended on the grounds of Schmitt's texts and positions.
I will argue that Schmitt's concept is not far from the approach that András Jakab described as "Classical State-Centrism" and which has been defended in various modifications by a number of renowned constitutional lawyers in the second half of the 20th century. His position is therefore less radical than the exceptionalist interpretation suggests.