Abstract
The issue of actio popularis or popular action (standing) may seem marginal from the point of view of the current civil-procedure debate, perhaps suitable for a certain (quasi) anthropological examination of the process of enforcing private law. This seems to be supported by the fact that if there are mentions on actio popularis in contemporary case law, these are usually nothing more than contextual remarks rejecting the idea of actio popularis in the interest of a limited concept of the right of action, strictly tied to the factor of legal interest in providing legal protection.
But that would be an oversimplified view. It cannot be denied that examining actio popularis in its standard shape helps to understand the logic of civil litigation and law enforcement in general, but it is far from just that.
Reform tendencies in civil procedure nowadays are closely (if not exclusively) focused on new ways (modes) of enforcement of law and access to justice, and, in this respect, actio popularis can be, no doubt, an interesting source of inspiration.