Abstract
The crime of genocide, as enshrined in the Genocide Convention (GC), is notorious for its narrow scope. It is limited to violent acts directed against four protected groups (national, ethnical, racial and religious groups).
The paper discusses whether, and to what extent, this scope could be, and has been, extended by means of three mechanisms - the (re)interpretation of Article II of the GC, the emergence of a new rule of customary international law, and the revision of the GC or the adoption of a new treaty. The paper argues that the understanding of the protected groups has already been subject to changes.
Yet, rather than leading to the inclusion of new groups, these changes - carried out through the first mechanism - have made the definitions of the four classical groups broader and more flexible. With that, the first mechanism has reached its limits set by the text of the GC.
The other two mechanisms do not face similar limits and they could therefore be used to extend the list of the protected groups. The paper scrutinizes the main arguments against this extension (speciality argument, trivialization argument, etc.) showing that none of them stands on firm grounds.
At the same time, the paper rejects the view that the extension of the list - by the customary or conventional way - has already taken place. The house of the crime of genocide is still limited to four rooms only, although it could, and probably should, accommodate more of them.