Abstract
This study's aim is to critique the concept of distributed files in François Récanati's (mainly 2012, 2016) notion of mental files. This is atwofold critique regarding (i) the (dys)functionality of distributed files asmental files exclusively associated with proper names, and (ii) the (dys)functionality of distributed files in relation to the theoretical and methodological commitments of Récanati's approach as such.
In particular, Ipoint out that the existence of distributed files significantly complicates the otherwise relatively straightforward process of singular reference through mental files. Using model situations, I show how doubling files, i.e., the existence of two mental files associated with a single proper name, leads to the speaker being considered "irrational".
For these reasons, I argue for the elimination of system of distributed files, as I consider the intersections of content and the use of encyclopedic files to be sufficiently functional.