Abstract
The war in Ukraine has fundamentally affected most Europeans' perceptions of the future relations between Russia and the rest of Europe, as well as how (un)stable the current balance of power on the continent may be. The European Union is also an active player in this regard, having adopted extensive economic sanctions in response to the military conflict that has been ongoing for several months, targeting both influential Russian individuals and important sectors of the Russian economy, such as But what is the reason why, in the eyes of many Europeans, the economic sanctions imposed by the EU are coming too late or are being enforced 'half-cocked'?
The first part of the paper is aimed at a general overview of the main relevant provisions of the Union's primary law, in particular Article 29 TEU and Article 215 TFEU, the main relevant provisions on CFSP in the context of the application of economic sanctions. Their interrelationship and the importance of their 'double track' in the context of decision-making on CFSP matters will be reflected upon, using the commentary literature on the Treaties, examples from recent Council practice as well as CJEU case law.
The second part focuses on the issue of the enforceability of sanctions at the level of EU Member States. It presents the pending proposal to include the misdemeanour of violating EU sanctions as an 'EU crime', the definition of which could thus be the subject of a harmonisation directive setting a minimum standard for the determination of criminal sanctions and facts. I will discuss this initiative in the overall context of the systematics of Article 83 TFEU.
In the final section, I will then attempt to briefly present some options for speeding up, simplifying or streamlining the current decision-making procedures of the European institutions within the CFSP, so that the European Community's response to threats to international peace is timely and forceful.