Abstract
If someone happens to be born on a certain piece of the earth's crust, does that mean they are obligated to die for it? This misleading and perhaps factually inaccurate statement is a succinct summary of the question that the post introduced by this annotation is meant to answer. Misleading because it purposely bends the definition of the state and exempts it from the social and cultural element, and inaccurate because not all legal orders treat the obligation to expose oneself to the risk of death in the same way.
At the same time, however, it is an issue that has gone from being an abstract consideration to a pressing problem, weighing on many minds, and then back to something remote in recent months. In my contribution to the retreat, I would like to address the extent to which the duty to defend one's state, or otherwise participate in its protection, is indeed enshrined here, particularly in the context of the human rights standard achieved, but also beyond it.
For geopolitical reasons, the initial frame of reference will be the Czech Republic, in which I would try to analyse this mechanism in the most detailed way, with an emphasis on deviations from other states observing a similar human rights standard (i.e. selected signatories to the EUHR). Comparisons should then be provided by countries that have a different system of fundamental rights protection than the European one (the United States in particular is offered), as well as countries that have no or very weak protection system at all (e.g.
China or Japan). Indeed, the concept of states, often forced by supreme courts or supranational courts to act in favour of individuals, despite legitimate political will, seems difficult to reconcile with a situation in which the same states force their citizens to fall for it, for example, in a situation in which the political will and therefore the legitimacy of the actions of state power will necessarily be blurred.
Here I find it convenient to list theories that try to justify this situation as well as those that try to do the opposite. Apart from the relevant academic literature, often mainly philosophical in nature, the key to the above proposed comparison is the legislation of the respective states and, where available, the adjacent case law.
The conclusion of the paper, then, is rather ambitious, namely, to try to suggest, on the basis of a comparative perspective, a mechanism whereby states might not be able to touch the lives of their citizens and yet have a chance to survive. What is on offer, of course, is money.
But is it worth buying the right not to have to die for the state?