Abstract
In this book we propose to study the identification of the productive imagination with reason within Schelling's aesthetic idealism, an identification which leads us to propose, in what follows, an "inverted" philosophical reading of the power of aesthetic judgement of the Critique of the power of judgement (1790) of Kant, based on the monistimmanent metaphysics of Schelling's System of Identity (1801-1804). This approach to Kant's third Critique also demonstrates the originality of this dissertation, since the traditional reading of the Critique of the power of judgement with German idealism has underlined, from Hegel to Lukacs or Hartmann, the centrality of the teleological part of the work of 1790.
The authors of German idealism and romanticism mainly saw teleological judgment as a factor of unity between the theoretical and practical domains. This point of the Kantian argument can be seen as a link between Spinoza and Hegel regarding the concepts of organism, totality and reciprocal action, which Hegel mainly brings into play in his conception of a system.
In this book, we will travel a more winding and heterodox path, less explored, which focuses on the objective potential of the aesthetic phenomenon, as well as on its scope and limits, in the reverse transition that we propose, from Schelling to Kant.