Abstract
Independence is a core attribute necessary for a central bank aspiring to succeed in its fight with inflation. From legal point of view independence of a central bank means its independence on other branches of state power, namely the legislative and judicial branches, and, above all, the executive branch.
Personnel independence is, in addition to institutional, instrumental and financial independences an important element of central bank's position among other state institutions. Personnel independence is reflected in the manner of appointing and removing the top officials of the central bank.
In Czech National Bank its personnel independence is manifested in the model of appointing the members of its top executive body setting the bank's monetary policy, the Bank Board, by the President of the Republic without any involvement of the Cabinet. However, the exercise of the appointing power by the Presidents at their full discretion may lead to somewhat subjective assessment of the nominees' professional and personal backgrounds and to arbitrariness in the selection of the appointees.
It is thus appropriate to think about an alternative model of appointing in which another constitutional body, in addition to the President, would be involved. For several reasons such constitutional body should be as remote as possible from the Cabinet and its members.
Considering options in this direction of thinking, one cannot avoid regarding the Senate to play that role. In any case, modification of the current model of constituting the Bank Board brings about the need of a constitutional change which should not be superficial and precipitate but is to be adopted only upon thorough analysis and discussion.