Abstrakt
Using over 20,000 electoral slates from municipal elections in the Czech Republic, we document that in proportional representation electoral systems political parties rank candidates on the slates systematically according to their valence, measured by educational attainment, and intra-party value, measured by political donations and membership. The observed patterns are consistent with market mechanisms where the party leaders benefit from the valence and intra-party value of candidates and offer slate positions (i.e. the probability of winning a mandate) in exchange.
We show that candidates with high valence and those who possess more intra-party value are placed in better-ranked positions, despite the fact that candidates with more intra-party value, conditional on observables, tend to receive relatively fewer votes than candidates with low intra-party value. We further show that as a party expects to hold more council seats, the share of their candidates with higher intra-party value increases.