Abstract
Continental law usually (and, in fact, quite often) uses the concept of "subject of law", which is basically interchangeable with the concept of "person". However, the term "subject of law" is practically non-existent in Anglo-American law, and if a similar concept can be encountered, then in a completely different context.
This will be true of an entity forming objective "law", i.e. a "lawmaker" of a kind. If the law is an object, then there must also be an entity that forms (or makes) the law.
In the system of civil law, this entity will usually be the state - this concept relates to the idea of pure theory of law that the state and legal order are, in fact, one and the same thing. The view of Anglo-American law in this regard differs just like the concept of a state governed by law (Rechtsstaat) differs from the concept of a rule of law.
If the law cannot be easily equated to the state in the Anglo-American legal system, then one should seek some transcendental entity (subject) which forms the law. In Anglo-American law, the one who directly participates in the formation of law is precisely the court, or a judge who is entitled to judicial law making.
A judge can be understood as an individual subject of law, because in an individual case he makes the law. From the point of view of Anglo-American law, the judge can thus be considered a subject of law, while in continental law it is the opposite.
The aim of this paper is to explain why this is so.