Abstract
In the article, I generally address the question regarding the scope of authority of the Grand Chambers, i.e., in which cases the "small" chambers of the highest courts in the Czech Republic are obliged to submit a case to this special body whose purpose is to unify the jurisprudence of a given court. Clarification of this question is particularly significant to fulfil the right to a lawful judge in Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.
First, I present the general principles determining under what conditions the "small" chamber is obliged to submit a case to the Grand Chamber. It must do so if it wishes to deviate from the opinion expressed in a previous decision of the court or if it encounters conflicting jurisprudence. However, judicial practice has created exceptions to this general rule. According to the Supreme Administrative Court, for example, "small" chambers do not have to activate the Grand Chamber if the Constitutional Court has authoritatively resolved the disputed question with consistent findings that the Supreme Administrative Court did not consider in its decisions. However, the Supreme Court takes a different stance on this issue, and even in such cases, it requires the case to be formally submitted to the Grand Chamber. This procedure can create tensions between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, as the Grand Chamber often tends to continue contesting the opinion issued by the "small" chamber of the Constitutional Court, even though the decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on the Supreme Court.
In the next part of the article, for practical reasons, I focus exclusively on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court. Specifically, I deeper research the issue of isolated excessive judicial decisions.
The first group consists of excessive decisions that deviate from the legal opinion expressed in the decision of the Grand Chamber. The legal opinion contained in such a decision is not binding, and there is no need to submit the case to the Grand Chamber for unification. However, I illustrate on specific cases how declaring a particular decision as excessive can be contentious. In practice, "small" chambers may differ in their assessment of whether the legal opinion of the Grand Chamber also affects the question under consideration or how to interpret the general conclusions of the Grand Chamber. As a result, they may also evaluate differently whether a decision that did not respect the opinion of the Grand Chamber is excessive or not.
In the next chapter, I address the second group of excessive decisions, which deviate from the established, prevailing jurisprudence, in the situation when the Grand Chamber has not yet ruled on the specific question. According to the current practice of the Grand Chamber, "small" chamber cannot declare such a decision excessive without submitting the matter to the Grand Chamber for unification. In these cases, the Grand Chamber interprets its authority very broadly. Tenth chamber tries to reverse this practice as it submitted a proposal to the Grand Chamber, in connection with a specific case, to reevaluate its broad authority. According to the Tenth chamber, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court is "unified not only by ruling of the Grand Chamber but also evolutionarily, i.e., by the decision practice of small chambers".
In the conclusion of the article, I compare the outlined issue with the approach to isolated excessive judicial decisions in Anglo-American legal culture and introduce the doctrine of per incuriam decisions.