Abstract
Kant's critique of metaphysics was not aimed at its whole destruction, but rather at its emendation. This becomes obvious, if we take into account Kant's conception of the development of metaphysics which comes about in three steps.
Kant named them as dogmatism, scepticism and criticism. It is not controversial to assume that criticism means Kant's own position.
If this is so, then one can also assume that Kant understood his own position as a third and last step in the development of metaphysics and therefore as a part of metaphysics. It is the aim of this essay to analyse this onception as it is presented in the Critique of pure reason and in the essay On the progress of metaphysics.
There are first some prelimary remarks to make in order to explain the notion of development and its implications. Then in the second and third step an analysis is provided of this conception in the Critique of pure reason and in On the progress of metaphysics.
In the last and fourth step the function of natural theology [theologia naturalis] is to be explained as it is found in the essay On the Progress of Metaphysics.