Abstract
The author interprets Hegel's phenomenology against the background of Kierkegaard's thesis that "repetition will play a very important role in modern philosophy". She shows that Hegel refers to repetition in fundamental moments of his work, even though he never explicitly thematised it.
In the form of "doubling", "tautological explanation" and "recollection", repetition is not is not just a subjective ability; as custom or tradition, it forms the substance of every society, the inner dynamic of the objective spirit. The structure of repetition is particularly evident in absolute knowledge.
The book culminates not in a catharsis, but in recollection, which "is the inner and in fact the higher form of substance". But why is the hinge around which the concluding passages revolve precisely recollection? Absolute knowledge is not new knowledge; rather, it is an ability to take on the knowledge acquired on the "path of doubt and despair".
What is fundamental here is that the consciousness actively carries out this retrospection and reviews the respective structures that were acquired in the individual phases. The author thus understands recollection as the active embodiment and thus also repetition of those structures that the individual person recognises as essential for self-expression along the way.