Abstract
The article focuses on problematic aspects of Aristotle's view on shame (aidós) and its relation to virtue. On one hand, Aristotle counts shame among emotions (pathé), and on the other he discusses it as a mean (mesotés) or state (hexis) that is not a virtue, yet still praiseworthy in certain conditions.
After an analysis of relation between shame and choice (prohairesis), the article distinguishes between a positive desire of honor (timé), whose best expressions are to be found in magnanimity (megalopsychia) and love of honour (filotimia), and a negative fear of dishonour (adoxia), which is expressed in shame. Shame as a mixed affective disposition (hexis pathétiké) independent on choice (prohairesis) is then contrasted to continence (enkrateia) as a mixed prohairetic disposition that is inseparable from choice.